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THE ECHOES OF 1960 COUP: WHO SAID WHAT?

A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Intellectuals Responses of 1960 Coup

Ayşe Merve OKUTAN

Political Science and International Relations | TED University

PSIR335: Formation of Modern Turkey

Assoc. Prof. Selin AKYÜZ TURSUN

Fall, 2023

Abstract

Assuming power in 1950, the Democrat Party played a pivotal role in shaping Turkey’s political trajectory, particularly in its transition towards a multi-party system. However, the prolonged era of single-party rule, which persisted since the establishment of the Republic, posed significant obstacles to the integration of democratic principles during the Democrat Party’s tenure. Despite outwardly advocating for ‘democracy’ in its electoral rhetoric, the party noticeably fell short of realizing its pre-electoral commitments, perpetuating a governing style that echoed the antidemocratic and oppressive methods of the preceding single-party paradigm. Widespread discord with political adversaries, public dissent, and challenges encountered in the democratization process collectively acted as catalysts for a consequential governmental transition. Ultimately, this transformative process, with the potential to serve as a pivotal moment for the democratization of the Republic of Turkey and its evolution into a multi-party system, was not effectively harnessed, culminating in the inaugural coup d’état on May 27, 1960. While the May 27 coup provided an opportunity for proponents of governmental change, it simultaneously drew significant concern and criticism from those opposed to the coup.

This study aims to provide a comparative analysis of the 1960 coup d’état by examining the viewpoints of Turkish intellectuals aligned with both right-wing and left-wing ideologies. In this context, the study delved into the perspectives of Cemal Süreya, Attilla İlhan and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir on the coup, as left-wing Turkish intellectuals on the coup while delved into the perspectives of Ali Fuat Başgil, and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar as a right-wing Turkis intellectuals.

Keywords: 27 May 1960, coup d’état, Democrat Party, junta, Turkish intellectuals.

 

INTRODUCTION

In the 1940s, both the external impacts of the Second World War and the domestic political challenges arising from the long-standing one-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) brought the idea of multi-party politics back to the forefront. Eventually, changes in international dynamics, public dissatisfaction with the administration, and internal divisions within the RPP led to the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) on January 7, 1946. The DP not only emerged as a challenger to the RPP, but also played a crucial role in Turkey’s democratization process. Advocating for liberalization in the economic and political spheres, the DP secured over sixty seats in the July 21 elections, held about six months after its formation. Although the democratic and transparent nature of these elections was questioned for an extended period, they marked a significant turning point for the DP Indeed, the elections held four years later, on May 14, 1950, resulted in an absolute victory for the DP.

The RPP, that expect, even sure to win, accepted defeat, the DP to come to power. The DP’s election campaign, marked by the slogan “Yeter! Söz milletindir”, concluded 27 years of one-party rule, initiating a historic period defined as the ‘transition to democracy’ in the Republic of Turkey. The period between 1950 and 1954 witnessed a relatively free and democratic and economic prosperity environmet. environment. This era contributed to the again DP’s success in the 1954 elections. Conversely, the RPP experienced a notable decrease in both its share of the vote and the number of deputies compared to the previous year. However, the DP gradually deviated from its democratic rhetoric after its second term. Increasing repression, an economic crisis, and an antidemocratic stance led to a decline in support, prompting early elections in 1957.

Despite the decrease in votes, the DP managed to reclaim sole power in 1957. In the October 27th elections, the RPP’s share of the vote increased, fostering confidence that heightened opposition pressure on the government. The period following 1957 was marked by heightened tensions in both social relations and interactions between the government and the opposition. Despite regaining power for the third time, the DP persisted in oppressive practices and stringent policies, leading to a gradual decline in its support.

The party attempted to bolster its strength through frontalization and etc., but these efforts proved unsuccessful. In 1958, after the coup in Iraq, the opposition party’s pro-coup rhetoric increased in Turkey. The period from 1959 to 1960 was one of the tensest periods both socially and in terms of opposition-government relations. The DP’s antidemocratic moves and the increasingly harsh reactions from the opposition caused chaos in the country; so much so that the disagreement between the parties in this process was not limited to verbal clashes in the parliament, but sometimes turned into physical clashes. The DP established the Investigation Commission with a law passed on April 18, 1960, to prevent the political activities of the RPP and to deter the RPP; this commission, which was given broad powers, received intense reactions from both the RPP and the public and caused social turmoil.

Ultimately, the 1957 elections marked the last elections of both DP government and last elections before the first coup d’état in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The military men, which had been preparing for a coup for a long time, announced the seizure of power on May 27, 1960, with a declaration read by Alparslan Türkeş in the early hours of the morning.

The first coup d’état in the Republic of Turkey was generally received positively during the coup period and its early years. So much so that Yakup Kadri described May 27 as “the rebirth of the sun in social life,” even though the concept of the coup was diametrically opposed to democracy. It was only years later that negative discourses about the coup were voiced.

This study focused on intellectuals’ perspective on the May 27, 1960 coup d’état. The first part briefly discusses the developments during the DP period from 1950 to 1960 and evaluates the events leading to the coup. The second part analyzes the approach of Turkish intellectuals to the coup, categorizing them into right-wing and left-wing intellectuals. The works of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Cemal Süreyya, and Atilla İlhan are examined to understand the viewpoint of left-wing intellectuals, while Ali Fuat Başgil and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar are scrutinized to represent right-wing intellectuals. The study aims to reveal both the common and differing opinions of intellectuals from opposing ideologies regarding the coup and shed light on the role of Turkish intellectuals in the history of Turkish democracy.                                                                                                              I.      CHAPTER

TURKEY’S CHALLENGE IN ADAPTING TO DEMOCRACY:

DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA TO THE COUP (1950-1960)

The 1950 elections in the Republic of Turkey marked a significant turning point, offering hope for the democratization process in a country that had long been under a single-party regime. The DP, with its promise of freedom against the increasingly authoritarian RPP, secured victory with 53.59% of the vote on May 14, 1950. This unexpected outcome led to the peaceful transfer of power from the RPP to the DP on May 22nd. After this transition, Celal Bayar became president, Adnan Menderes assumed the role of prime minister, and Refik Koraltan became the president of assembly. Karpat (2022, p. 316) considered the transfer of power in a democratic, calm, and normal manner as a new evolution in Turkish democracy and entering new phase of Turkish politics.

In 1950, the DP clinched power for the first time, securing a solo victory in both the 1954 and early 1957 elections. However, the shift from 27 years of single-party rule posed a formidable challenge for Turkey. The DP’s election campaign rallied behind the resonant slogan “Yeter! Söz milletindir” Initially pledging freedom and democracy, the DP underwent a transformation, adopting a repressive and authoritarian regime after its initial term from 1950 to 1954.

Inevitably, the confluence of hurdles in adapting to democratic norms and the DP’s political and economic policies, which characterized by repressiveness and antidemocratic, paved the way for Turkey’s inaugural coup d’état on May 27, 1960. In this chapter, focused on the pivotal DP reforms during the 1950-1960 period. The reforms of DP were scrutinized through three periodic processes: the initial period of governance, from 1950 to 1954; the second period of government, from 1954 to 1957; and the last period of government, from 1957 to 1960.

  • 1950-1954

Adnan Menderes, designated by Celal Bayar to establish the government following the electoral triumph of the DP, unveiled the inaugural cabinet on May 22, 1950. The First Menderes Cabinet comprised names such as Tevfik İleri, Refik Şevket İnce, Halil Özyörük, and Fahri Belen etc. Fuad Köprülü assumed the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subsequent to the cabinet’s proclamation, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, serving as the editor-in-chief of Zafer Newspaper, articulated in his article titled “Menderes Cabinet” that the recently constituted government comprised ministers who possessed a profound understanding of the populace’s issues and garnered widespread acclaim among the citizens.[1] After the cabinet’s announcement, the Council of Ministers assembled under the guidance of Celal Bayar to deliberate upon the components of the government program, with a substantial portion drawn from the election manifesto. However, the DP was ill-prepared to power; the election manifesto, released mere days before the 1950 elections, lacked the necessary clarity regarding the government’s intended policies (Demirel, 2021, p. 130). Following four days of intensive deliberations by the Council of Ministers, Adnan Menderes primarily directed his attention towards addressing economic challenges. He mentioned issues such as the ineffectiveness of the state economy, escalating state indebtedness, elevated interest rates, and diminished producer investments stemming from these predicaments. Menderes attributed these problems to what he considered misguided economic policies pursued by the RPP. Subsequently, Menderes outlined the overarching policies to be pursued by the new government, encapsulated within four key titles:[2]

  1. To achieve the highest level of cost savings in government services, with a focus on minimizing state expenditures.
  2. To expedite robust economic growth, there was a commitment to increase the budgetary allocation for investments and dedicate all available resources to promote production. A comprehensive set of measures would be implemented to incentivize and support private enterprise, facilitating the inflow of capital into domestic production and encouraging foreign investors.
  3. The allocation of investment costs for economic development would be meticulously planned to align with the current fiscal position of the government.
  4. The elimination of detrimental state and bureaucratic obstacles hindering production was prioritized.

The program was introduced to the parliament on May 29, triggering criticism from the RPP due to its deviation from the principle of statism. This divergence in ideology led to intense and contentious debates during the parliamentary deliberations. During the single-party era that preceded this development, various aspects, including the economy, were under the direct management of the state. However, the new government’s governance approach was grounded in liberal principles, marking a significant departure from the previous state-centric model. Deputies of the RPP, who felt that they had not been given adequate voice, left the meeting and did not participate in the vote. Moreover, some DP’s deputy also did not vote; this was a signal of a lack of confidence in the new government. Nevertheless, the program was unanimously approved by 282 DP deputies.

In addition to its economic policies, the DP also implemented alterations within the military and administrative hierarchies. Historically, during the single-party era, both the military and the bureaucracy held significant sway and were crucial sources of trust for the RPP. The election results came as a surprise to both the public and the RPP. After the DP’s electoral victory, there was widespread apprehension that the military, which had become accustomed to the one-party system, might resist change. However, contrary to popular opinion, RPP peacefully handed over government to DP; this was a significant milestone for Turkish democracy.

In reality, neither the military nor the RPP were pleased with this change in government. DP harbored deep concerns that the RPP might leverage its influence within the state to regain power by orchestrating an artificial atmosphere of crisis and chaos. Approximately one month after the election, on June 5, a colonel visited Adnan Menderes and conveyed information about an impending coup scheduled for June 8-9; in response, Menderes, in consultation with Celal Bayar, decided to take precautionary measures against the military (Eroğul, 1990, p. 56).  On June 6, unprecedented before and significant changes were implemented within the Turkish military in the Turkish Republic’s history. A considerable number of high-ranking military officials underwent replacements, including the chiefs of the general staff, commanders of the naval and air forces, as well as commanders of the first and third armies; in the ongoing process, a substantial number of generals and colonels were retired from their positions. This abrupt action by Adnan Menderes to safeguard himself and the DP government sent shockwaves through the military.

The transformation in military personnel continued by a shift in bureaucratic ranks, particularly those bureaucrats who were loyal to the state tradition and the RPP. This bureaucratic overhaul started in highest levels with and nine governors, who were deemed to have engaged in RPP-promoting

propaganda, were retired.[3] The alterations within the bureaucracy were comparatively more superficial than those carried out in the military, previously staffed bureaucracy, created under the RPP, persisted as the foundational structure under the DP. The successive changes have deeply unsettled the RPP. During this period, İnönü criticized DP in his speech and expressed that the country was experiencing a sense of turmoil, with every official within the state apparatus apprehensive of potential dismissals on grounds of false accusations (Çakmak, 2015, p. 2).

Between 1950 and 1954, the DP embarked on a series of sweeping reforms. One of the most significant of these reforms was the removal of the ban on the Arabic call to prayer shortly after assuming power. On June 16, 1950, the issue of the Arabic call to prayer was brought to a parliamentary vote and received approval from both DP and RPP deputies. Consequently, the call to prayer, which had been recited in Turkish for the preceding 12 years since 1938, was reinstated in Arabic. Furthermore, during the DP era, there was an expansion in the scope of religious education, and the type of education to be imparted was made subject to the discretion of individual families;  there was a discernible uptick in the number of imam hatips religious vocational schools and mosques (Keskin, 2014, p. 114).

DP adopted a notably more libertarian and liberal political approach. In fact, its reforms, particularly in the realm of religion, garnered substantial support from the public. Nonetheless, as 1950 drew to a close, tensions between the opposition and the government began to escalate gradually. One of the primary policies that faced criticism from the RPP was the DP’s efforts to attract foreign capital and the concessions granted to foreign entities in this regard. As per the RPP, it was not appropriate to provide a such extensive array of privileges to foreign entities. The intensifying hostility between the opposition and the DP, along with the DP’s verbal and concrete measures taken against the opposition, gave rise to a growing political tension by the close of 1950.

Throughout this period, one of the most concerning issues for the DP was the status of the People’s Houses. During the single-party era, the absence of an opposition to scrutinize and oversee the People’s Houses had caused these institutions to stray from their intended purpose, ultimately transforming them into entities aligned with the RPP. DP assuming power, the People’s Houses became a focal point of political controversy. From the DP’s perspective, these institutions were utilized by the RPP for party propaganda and to advance their revolutionary agenda (Abdurahmanlı, 2021, p. 3). Ultimately, a draft law, about closure of the People’s Houses.  was presented on August 8, 1951, and it was published in the Official Gazette on August 11, 1951, coming into force.

Additionally, the DP directed its attention toward the RPP material resources. The DP believed that the financial prowess of the opposition would translate into greater assertiveness in electoral processes. Uneasy about the RPP’s financial might, the DP’s initial action was to introduce legislation prohibiting political parties from acquiring real estate for non-political purposes. Since its establishment, the RPP had accumulated substantial wealth through state funds and donations, with a significant portion of this wealth comprising real estate holdings. Amidst this period of upheaval, numerous DP’ deputies contended that the RPP had misappropriated both real estate and funds, utilizing state resources during its tenure in government and they introduced a bill within the DP, proposing the state confiscate these assets (Eroğul, 1990, p. 76). During this period, which Eroğul (1990, p. 62)  refers to as “digging up old books,” the assets of the RPP were also seized in 1953, subsequent to the closure of the People’s Houses.

Despite all the turmoil, the Democratic Party’s (DP) first term in office was notably successful, even it was the most successful of its three terms. Through agricultural and industrial reforms, as well as loans and foreign investments, the welfare of the population experienced a significant boost. Additionally, the DP garnered public trust by implementing citizen-centric social policies. Consequently, it achieved easy and absolute victory in the 1954 elections.

The period leading up to the 1954 elections can be described as a phase during which the RPP gradually diminished in influence. The government paid minimal heed to the RPP’s rhetoric, to the extent that even the decision to dispatch troops to Korea was made without seeking the RPP’s input or consultation. Factors such as the seizure of the RPP assets shortly before the election, the declining financial resources of the RPP, and its success in the 1951 municipal elections collectively heightened the DP motivation. As a result, in the electoral campaigns that started in 1954, there was a DP with high self-confidence and an RPP that had difficulty expressing itself to the public. This was also evident in the election campaigns.

Rıfkı Salim Burçak (1998, pp. 201–211), in “On Yılın Anıları”, enumerates various accomplishments of his party, the DP, including ports, dams, village roads, foreign capital legislation, and advancements in democracy, among others. In fact, during the 1954 elections, the DP centered its campaign on these achievements. As Adnan Menderes traveled around the country, he often criticized İsmet İnönü and the RPP while highlighting the significance of agricultural mechanization, economic growth, and democratic advancements which occurred in DP’s term. On the other hand, the RPP structured its election propaganda around three key focal points: İnönü’s personality, critiques of the DP’s policies and Menderes’s partisanship, and economic matters. Prior to the elections, there was discussion about a potential alliance between the Republican Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi), a successor to the Nation Party (Millet Partisi), and the RPP. However, due to criticism within the RPP, this alliance did not materialize, and the RPP entered the elections independently. While there was no formal alliance between the two parties, the Republican Nation Party openly expressed its support for İsmet İnönü and RPP; additionally with the leader of the Turkish Villagers’ Party (Türkiye Köylü Partisi), Osman Bölükbaşı, frequently lauding the RPP and İnönü in his campaign rallies (Kaya, 2018, p. 2284).

Ultimately, with approximately 88% of the population participating in the election, which featured four parties but was primarily a contest between the Republican RPP and the DP, the DP secured an absolute victory again, garnering over 58% of the vote while RPP 35%.[4] The DP’s second term in power proved to be considerably more challenging than the first and eventually resulted in early elections. High voter turnout is indeed of paramount importance for a democratic Turkey. Albayrak (2004, p. 259)  interpreted this “the people like democracy.”

  • 1954-1957

Following the establishment of the cabinet on May 17, 1954, Menderes introduced the government’s new program to the DP parliamentary group on May 23, 1954, and it received approval with the votes of 411 deputies. Subsequently, during his address while presenting the program to the parliament, Menderes underscored that the era of ‘devri sabık’ had concluded.[5] The parliament endorsed the government’s new program on May 26, 1954.

The period between 1954 and 1957 was the most arduous phase for the Democratic Party (DP). In the 1954 elections, a significant part of the DP’s success was attributed to economic factors, making the continuation of public support contingent upon sustained economic growth. The previously unplanned economic policies implemented for development during the initial period began to unravel slowly during this time. However, government’s policy during the second term closely resembled that of the first term. Karpat (2015, p. 185)  interpreted this by suggesting that the electoral victory encouraged the DP to adopt inflationary policies. Menderes, who pursued an agriculture-oriented economic policy in this period, did not achieve the success he wanted. In the first period of DP, favorable climatic conditions, heightened demand for agricultural products prompted by the Korean War, and price increases resulting from the war contributed to the success of their economic policies. However, the economic strategies centered on agriculture and foreign trade began to falter in 1954; following the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, foreign trade deficits caused an economic downturn during this period (Evsile, 2022, p. 159).

The escalating foreign debt, trade imbalances, exchange rate fluctuations, and a decrease in the purchasing power of the populace intensified criticism of the government and bolstered the RPP. On the other hand, heightened criticism compelled the party to enact more stringent measures. Between 1954 and 1957, significant alterations were implemented, including the attachment of university professors to the ministry, limitations placed on gatherings and marches, and restrictions on trade union activities (Turan, 1999, pp. 95–117).

Figure 1: İstanbul Ekspres (1955) 2nd Edition

One of the significant developments during the second period was the September 6-7 events of 1955. The Turkish-Greek tensions, primarily stemming from the Cyprus problem, reached their zenith with the bomb explosion near Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki on September 5. This explosion, reported to the Turkish public with the headline “Atamızın Evi Bombay ile Hasara Uğradı” by Istanbul Express, served as a catalyst for the events of September 6-7. A few hours after the news were disseminated, several student unions organized a protest rally in Taksim Square in response to the call from the Turkish Cypriot Community Association. Following the rally, tensions escalated, and certain groups launched attacks on non- Muslim businesses in the vicinity. Protests with slogans like “Kıbrıs Türk’tür, Türk Kalacak” and featuring posters of Atatürk rapidly spread throughout Istanbul, leading to the targeting of Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities. While there were no reports of looting incidents at the outset of the demonstration, such incidents began to occur as the situation spiraled out of control (Karavuluk, 2018, p. 42). The events eventually spread to cities like Izmir, Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, Samsun, and Eskişehir, prompting the Menderes government to declare martial law. Following the September 6-7 events, Turkey’s relations with Greece worsened, its advancements in Cyprus were reversed, and the events resulted in significant material damage to the country. The press and the opposition found common ground in their belief that the government had supported the events. This development alarmed the DP leading them to exert pressure on the media, much like they had done with universities and the opposition, by hastily enacting press laws.

The years 1955-1956 could be characterized as one of the most challenging periods for the DP government due to the inadequate handling of the September 6-7 events, mounting pressure, and a deteriorating economy. During this time, the DP faced significant challenges, not only from domestic and international factors but also from internal issues within the party. The confidence of DP deputies in the cabinet started to wane, and questions arose regarding Menderes’ position as Prime Minister. Following the suggestion of Mükerrem Sarol, a close confidant of Menderes who was considering resignation and would later face trial at Yassıada, Menderes sought a vote of confidence for own (Güzelipek, 2017, pp. 85–86).[6] Menderes, after securing the vote of confidence, decided not to resign and went on to form a new government on the same day. As the turmoil within the government escalated, Fuad Köprülü tendered his resignation. The resignation of one of the four founders of the party, who cited internal issues as the reason for his departure, further intensified the pressure on Menderes.

The government’s failures and the public’s reactions rekindled the RPP hopes of returning to power. With increasing public support, the RPP intensified its criticism of the government. In order to thwart any attempts by opposition parties to unite against it, the government enacted a new electoral law that prevented both opposition parties from running on a joint ticket and forming a new party. Immediately thereafter, the DP, concerned about the potential further erosion of its support, rescheduled the elections originally set for 1958 to October 27, 1957. Consequently, this marked the first instance of early elections in the history of the Republic of Turkey.

 

DP had initially promised democracy upon coming to power, but with time, it started drifting away from these pledges and gradually reverted to a more repressive environment reminiscent of the single-party regime. The tense relationship between the DP and the Republican People’s Party (RPP), which had been engaged in arguments on numerous issues for nearly 7 years, began to thaw in the lead-up to the 1957 elections. During this period, Menderes was first invited to the CHP Izmir Provincial Congress, and later İnönü paid a visit to the DP administration in Izmir (Dokuyan, 2023, pp. 156–157). However, this period of détente was short-lived. Leading up to the elections, the most commonly debated topics were the government’s authoritarian policies and the declining economy. The initially cordial atmosphere between Menderes and İnönü quickly transformed into a period of harsh and acrimonious election campaigning. The Republican RPP began to reference the “devri sabık,” a term frequently used by the DP as a form of intimidation during its time in power.

Ultimately, in the 1957 elections, which remained controversial for many years, both during and after the electoral process, the Democratic Party DP was able to secure a majority on its own. Nevertheless, the DP saw a decline of approximately ten percentage points in its vote share, receiving fewer votes than all the other parties that participated in the elections. In contrast, the RPP experienced some amounts increase in its vote share.

Kaynar (2019, p. 314) emphasizes that, apart from the poor economic conditions and Menderes’s authoritarian rule, another significant factor contributing to the shift of votes from the DP to the RPP and the RPP’s increased success compared to the 1950 and 1954 elections was the RPP’s departure from being a center-right party and its adoption of the principles of statism and secularism together.

  • 1957-1960

 Despite not receiving the expected number of votes, the DP emerged as the winner of the 1957 elections. With the RPP securing more than 180 parliamentary seats, it began a political battle against the DP government, marked by continuous questioning and motions of censure. The RPP heightened its criticism by raising parliamentary inquiries about issues like the premature announcement of election results on the radio and the use of state vehicles for election propaganda.

Menderes moved to elections an earlier time for intention of stabilizing and pacifying the public, but the outcome turned out to be contrary to his expectations. After the election, he faced significant challenges, including a delay of almost a month in announcing his new cabinet, which left him unable to undertake nearly any action once the cabinet was finally announced. The DP government’s legitimacy was often questioned by the RPP as its votes fell below 50%. The aggravation of economic conditions also increased RPP’s criticism of the government. On the other hand, the RPP, dissatisfied with the votes it received, instead of dealing with the problems of the citizens, tried to suppress the opposition. DP government started to experience a gradual decline at the outset of 1958. During this period, even Ali Fuad Başgil, who was not a DP member but had been highly active and loyal to the DP, authored articles criticizing the government’s policies.

One significant development in the last term of the DP rule was the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. Ahmad (1992, p. 91) asserted that the Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958, instilled a genuine fear of revolution in the minds of the DP. This revolution in Iraq also had an impact on the dynamics of power and opposition relations in Turkey.

By 1960, a coalition opposing the DP had coalesced, encompassing students, the RPP, the media, and intellectual circles. The DP, intent on quelling this opposition and steadfast in its unyielding policies, formulated a motion to establish an investigative commission. The rationale behind this motion centered on allegations that the RPP aimed to subvert the government, that the media endorsed the RPP’s purported “illegitimate” endeavors, and that the military was intervening in political affairs. Following a parliamentary vote, this motion was ratified, marking one of the DP’s final actions while in power.

Upon the formation of the Investigation Commission, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) initiated a boycott, receiving backing from students and academics affiliated with Istanbul and Ankara Universities. On May 28, students from Istanbul University congregated, protest government the with slogan of “Kahrolsun hükümet, Menderes istifa”. Initially, the police dispersed the demonstrators, yet the students subsequently reassembled, rallying behind the slogan “Polis gitsin, asker gelsin”. In response, mounted police and infantry units intervened with heightened aggression.

On the following day, April 29, demonstrations commenced at Ankara University. In the midst of these protests, Menderes tried reassuring the public, stating that Ankara remained tranquil and that only a few minor incidents had occurred in Istanbul. Among the most remarkable demonstrations that transpired during this period were the protests coded as “555K,” orchestrated by the RPP Youth Organization. Subsequently, on May 21, a march was orchestrated, featuring the participation of cadets. This event was a conspicuous signal that the military had entered the realm of politics. Ultimately, the DP choice to enact martial law in response to the university-related incidents proved ineffective, plunging the nation into a state of turmoil.

 

The coup was initiated by 37 military officers at 3:00 a.m. during the night between May 26 and May 27, starting in Istanbul. The coup, which took only an hour to seize crucial locations, was officially announced at 05:25 through a statement read by Alparslan Türkeş on Ankara Radio. The coup plotters, who faced no opposition in Ankara and Istanbul, stated in their declaration that they had assumed control of the country in response to the crisis and democratic instability, aiming to prevent internal conflicts. They also pledged to conduct transparent and equitable elections promptly and transfer power to the victors of these elections.

The May 27 coup was a bloodless coup. The main reason for this was the decision taken by the organization before the revolution not to use weapons; no weapons were to be used except in self-defense. The coup was also greeted with great enthusiasm by the opposition groups against the DP.

Subsequent to the coup, members of the DP were transported to Yassıada for the purpose of facing legal proceedings. The constitution established the High Court of Justice, which undertook the prosecution of DP leaders at Yassıada. These proceedings, renowned as the Yassıada Trials, involved the trial of 592 defendants, who faced charges related to various offenses, including those stemming from the events of September 6-7, university protests, and the homeland front case.

 

 

  1. CHAPTER

TURKISH INTELLECTUALS AND THE 27 MAY: WHO SAD WHAT?

A Literature Review

Following the coup, Turkish intellectuals produced a plethora of articles that offered diverse perspectives on the event. Following the coup, Turkish intellectuals published a lots of articles that offered diverse perspectives on May 27. At this juncture, it is noteworthy that intellectuals representing both the right and left-wing, typically known for their divergent viewpoints on various matters, found common ground in recognizing the essentiality of the coup.

  1. Left-wing Intellectuals

Cemal Süreya

Cemal Süreya was as a symbol of the student protests in Ankara and Istanbul. Cemal Süreya’s poem “555K,” composed in response to the prevailing events, garnered both praise and criticism. This poem, written shortly before the coup, exemplified Süreya’s dual sentiments of anger towards the government and optimism for future:

“….

biz şimdi alçak sesle konuşuyoruz ya

sessizce birleşip sessizce ayrılıyoruz ya

anamız çay demliyor ya güzel günlere

sevgilimizse çiçekler koyuyor ya bardağa

sabahları işimize gidiyoruz ya sessiz sedasız

bu, böyle gidecek demek değil bu işler

biz şimdi yan yana geliyoruz ve çoğalıyoruz

ama bir ağızdan tutturduğumuz gün hürlüğün havasını

işte o gün sizi tanrılar bile kurtaramaz.”

(Süreya, 2010, p. 288)

Süreya made the following statement regarding the book, a compilation of poems he authored while in Paris:

“Göçebe’deki şiirleri 27 Mayıs Devrimi’nden sonra yazmışım. 1960 Anayasası’nın gökyüzünü “lçime çekiyorum”. O arada Avrupa’ya gidip gelmişim. Göçebe’yi (yani o şiiri) Paris’te tamamladım. Bu kitabımda daha bilinçliyim. Kendime bir yol seçmiş gibiyim. Yine de iki türlü şiir yazıyorum. Iki yaıum var, ikisini de bastıramıyorum sanki.”

(Süreya, 1991, p. 537)

As implied by these statements, Süreya viewed the 1960 coup d’état as ushering in a sense of liberation. To the extent that, in his poem “Kısa Türkiye Tarihi II,” composed well after the coup, he likened the 1960 constitution to a rose:[7]

“
….
üç anayasa
ortasında büyüdün:
biri akasya
biri gül
biri zakkum
…”

(Süreya, 2010, p. 220)

In conclusion, it can be asserted that Cemal Süreya, akin to the prevailing sentiment in the country, greeted the coup with a sense of enthusiasm.

Atilla İlhan

Atilla İlhan’s perspectives on the coup are most prominently delineated in his series of novels titled “Aynanın İçindekiler.” Within the narrative of this series, İlhan meticulously scrutinized the events preceding and succeeding May 27th. The initial three volumes of this series, commencing with “Bıçağın Ucu” and encompassing a total of seven books, namely, “Sırtlan Payı,” “Yaraya Tuz Basmak,” “Dersaadet’te Sabah Azanları,” “O Karanlıkta Biz,” “Reis Paşa,” and “Gazi Paşa,” delve into the May 27, 1960 coup d’état from three distinct vantage points.

The first book of the series, “Bıçağın Ucu,” narrates the tale of the social turmoil in the five months leading up to May 27 through the perspective of Suat, the novel’s central character. The book culminates in words reminiscent of the declaration articulated by Alparslan Türkeş on May 27:

“Dikkat! Dikkat! Büyük Türk Milleti! Silâhlı Kuvvetlerimiz, İstanbul, Ankara, Eskişehir ve diğer büyük merkezde, 27 Mayıs saat 03.00’ten itibaren idareyi ele almıştır.

Halim ve Suat, nefes almaktan korkarak, sonuna kadar dinlediler. Sevinçli fakat yorgundular. Derin bir cumhuriyet sessizliği oldu. Ve sonra saat, sabahı çaldı.”

(İlhan, 2005, p. 256)

The book accentuated a factual occurrence, and the exuberance displayed by the characters offered insight into Atilla İlhan’s stance regarding the coup; main characters, Halim and Suat, was tired for government, but coup announcement in radio made them happy. Indeed, in the preface of the book, he explicitly asserts that he, much like the majority, perceives May 27th as a “liberation from the dominance of specific individuals” (İlhan, 2005, p. 2).

The novel not only addresses the coup d’état but also delves into the oppressive demeanor of the DP government, particularly the constraints it imposed on the media. Within the narrative, the apprehension felt by opposition journalists is vividly portrayed, encapsulated through Halim’s fear of being exiled. Ultimately, by focusing on Halim and the three individuals sent into exile, the novel underscores the state of affairs under the government’s rule and endeavors to rationalize the necessity of the coup. Atilla İlhan critiques the government not only in “Bıçağın Ucu” but also in several of his novels by exploring the dynamics between the press and the government. In another installment of the series, “Yaraya Tuz Basmak,” the novel elucidates the constraints and censorship imposed upon the media, exemplified through the characters of Yüzbaşı Zizi and Ümid.

In conclusion, it can be asserted that Atilla İlhan, as evident from both his novels and his own statements in the preface of the book “Bıçağın Ucu,” held a favorable perspective toward May 27th. Through his literary works in the books within this series, İlhan addresses nearly all of the press restrictions imposed during the DP era.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir

Aydemir’s literary contributions,  “Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa,” which explores the life of Enver Pasha, “Tek Adam,” focusing on Atatürk, “İkinci Adam,” centered on İsmet İnönü, and “Menderes’in Dramı,” dedicated to DP, explains Turkey’s almost a hundred years history. Among his works, “Menderes’in Dramı” and “İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali” emerge as the texts where his perspectives on the coup d’état are most conspicuous.

In the introduction to his book “İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs,” which provides an account of the 1960 coup d’état, Aydemir abstains from issuing a definitive judgment, whether positive or negative, on the events of May 27th. Instead, he characterizes May 27th as “an intriguing occurrence in the recent history of the Republic of Turkey that embodies the concept of revolution.” Within the book, he initially delves into the subject of logic as a field of study, followed by an exploration of historical revolutions and their various forms. In Chapter 5, titled “İhtilale Çıkan Yol,” Aydemir elucidates the underlying causes that culminated in the events of May 27th. Aydemir  referred to the era preceding the DP government as the “pre-democracy” period (2000, p. 122). Subsequently, Aydemir meticulously examined the sequence of events leading to the coup and dissected the factors that contributed to the government’s vulnerability to the coup. However, although Aydemir endeavored, like İlhan, to provide a rationale for the coup, he never unequivocally support it. He even offers criticism of the National Unity Committee’s plans, characterizing them as utopian in nature (2000, p. 392).

As per Aydemir’s perspective, the coup (or revolution with his words) is neither a adventure  nor an imperative for society to reconcile its conflicting ideologies. Based on this work in which Aydemir delineates the coup process, it proves challenging to discern which his proximity to either side. Generally, however, Aydemir’s stance remains somewhat ambiguous, but it can be inferred that he leans more towards the anti-coup perspective. According to his approach, May 27th represented a brief insurrection aimed at governmental change. However, the subsequent transformation within the May 27th leadership escalated this uprising into a crisis. In his work “Menderes’in Dramı,” he adopted a similar standpoint. While he acknowledged the errors made by the DP, rather than endorsing the coup, he focused that what could have prevented a coup in the past.

  1. Right-wing Intellectuals

Ali Fuat Başgil

In the aftermath of the May 27 coup d’état, a total of 147 academics, among them Ali Fuad Başgil, were removed from their positions at universities through a decision made by the National Union Committee on October 28, 1960. Subsequent to his dismissal from the university, Başgil was arrested for his involvement in publishing an article that criticized the constituent assembly under the banner of Yeni Dünya  and endured approximately 60 days of imprisonment as a result. Başgil was a figure firmly committed to democracy and therefore distanced himself from the military’s seizure of power.

Başgil was a staunch advocate of democracy.Following the coup, he began writing for Yeni Sabah and Yeni İstanbul newspapers and explain his approach thorugh these articles. He approached the issue from a legal perspective, his own area of expertise. In a series of articles titled “Hukuk İlminin Işığında Gün Meseleleri,” he framed the coup within the context of the “right to resist.” In his first article, he justified this perspective by referencing the 1789 Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights. In his view, the coup d’état represented a right exercised against a state that had failed to protect its citizens.

In a different article published under the same title, Başgil referenced letters from diverse regions of the country to substantiate his confidence in the concept of a Government of National Unity. Additionally, he emphasized his belief that the Turkish Armed Forces is a non-partisan government. His writings make it clear that despite his own dismissal as a result of the coup, Başgil viewed the coup as an exercise of the right to resist and deemed it a legitimate action.[8]

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar

Tanpınar, a prominent figure in Turkish literature, exhibited a multifaceted approach in his works, at times embracing a mystical perspective, and at other times, espousing nationalist or modernist viewpoints. His political orientation can be discerned more explicitly in his writings concerning the Democratic Party (DP). Following World War II, Tanpınar aligned himself with İsmet İnönü’s policies and progressively demonstrated a stronger allegiance to İnönü, whom he reverently referred to as “The Great Chief,”[9] while simultaneously offering scathing criticisms of Menderes.

During the May 27 coup d’état, Tanpınar, who was in Paris, noted the day of the coup in his diary as “kurtulduk!” (Ulus, 2023, p. 647). Then on June 14, in his article “Suçüstü”, he compared the state to Oyijas’ stables and emphasized that the army had saved the state from this situation (Ulus, 2023, p. 647).

Despite facing accusations of harboring antipathy toward the DP, Tanpnıar did not shy away from criticizing the RPP following the events of May 27. In the view of Tanpınar, it was a misstep for the founding ideology to overlook Turkey’s Islamic identity and attempt to eradicate cultural values in an effort to distance itself from the Ottoman Empire’s legacy (Beyaz, 2023, p. 315). However, it’s important

to note that Tanpınar did not adopt an explicitly anti-coup stance; instead, he appeared to legitimize and commend the coup.[10]

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Ahmad, F. (1992). Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye (1945-1980). Hil Yayıncılık.

Albayrak, M. (2004). Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946-1960) (1st ed.). Phoenix Yayınevi.

Aydemir, Ş. S. (2000). İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (7th ed.). Remzi Kitabevi.

Beyaz, Y. (2023). Cezri Bir Batıcı Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. Hikmet – Akademik Edebiyat Dergisi, 18, 305–319. https://doi.org/10.28981/hikmet.1245654

Burçak, R. S. (1998). On Yılın Anıları: 1950-1960 (Vol. 1). Nurol Matbaacılık.

Çakmak, F. (2015). Closure of People’s Houses and Confiscation of Republican People’s Party’s Properties. International Journal of History, 7(3), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.9737/historyS1531

Demirel, T. (2021). Yeni Dönem: İktidarın İlk Yılları. In Türkiye’nin Uzun On Yılı: Demokrat Parti İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs Darbesi (3rd ed., pp. 130–151). İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Dokuyan, S. (2023). Menderes-İnönü Arasında Kısa Süren Bahar Havası ve Yansımaları (1957). Journal of Universal History Studies, 6(2), 147–167. https://doi.org/10.38000/juhis.1379662

Eroğul, C. (1990). Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (2nd ed.). İmge Kitabevi.

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Güzelipek, Y. A. (2017). In Party Opposition of Democrat Party and Turning Points: A Historical Analyse. International Journal of History, 9(3), 77–92. https://doi.org/10.9737/hist.2017.542

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Süreya, C. (1991). 999. Gün: Üstü Kalsın. Broy Yayınları.

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Turan, Ş. (1999). Kısıtlayıcı ve Cezalandırıcı Önlemler. In Türk Devrim Tarihi: Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye (14 Mayıs 1950—27 Mayıs 1960) (1st ed., pp. 95–117). Bilgi Yayınevi.

Ulus, Ö. M. (2023). Cumhuriyetimizin Yüzüncü Yılında Asker-Sivil İlişkilerine Yeniden Bakmak: Sivillerin Darbe Destekleri ve Cunta Girişimleri. Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences, 22 (Cumhuriyet’in 100. Yılı), 642–665. https://doi.org/10.21547/jss.1361370

 

[1] Fenik, M. F. (1950, May 24). C. Bayar Cumhurbaşkanı. Zafer Gazetesi, 1.

[2] TBMM Kararı. (1950, June 3). Resmi Gazete, s. 18579.

 

[3] İdare Amirliklerinde Yapılan Değişiklikler. (1950, June 11). Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, s. 1.

 

[4] For more information see.  https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1950-1977-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3007

[5] TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Volume: 1 Assembly: 3 Period: 10, Ankara, May 24, 1954, p. 23 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d10/c001/tbmm10001003.pdf.

 

[6] This practice of seeking a vote of confidence not on behalf of the government but personally, later became known in political literature as the Sarol Formula.

[7] In the poem, the constitution denoted as “akasya” corresponds to the 1924 constitution, while the constitution referred to as “zakkum” pertains to the 1982 constitution.

[8] Soysüren, Ali Haydar. “27 Mayıs Darbesi ve Ali Fuat Başgil.” Mülkiye Dergisi 45, no. 3 (September 2021): 641–65. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/mulkiye/issue/67349/1050152.

[9] Şahin, İ. (2021). Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’ın İmzasız Yazıları. Türük Uluslararası Dil, Edebiyat ve Halkbilimi Araştırmaları Dergis. https://doi.org/10.12992/TURUK1083

[10] https://birikimdergisi.com/guncel/11415/tanpinar-ne-zaman-gelecek